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I Articles I
New Conventions on Extradition in the
European Union: Analysis and
Evaluation
G. Vermeulen and T. Vander Beken*
I. Introduction
Extradition has always been a mainstay in the area' of
international cooperation in criminal matters between states.
Presently, the "new" basic instruments of the Council of Europe on
the international validity of criminal judgments2 and on the
transfer of proceedings in criminal matters3 do not threaten the
* Assistant-professors Criminal Law, Research Group Drug Policy, Criminal
Policy, International Crime, University of Ghent, Belgium.
1. H. Schultz, 'Das Ende der Auslieferung?,' in AKTUELLE PROBLEME DES
INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS. BEITRAGE ZUR GESTALTUNG DES INTERNA-
TIONALEN UND EINES SUPRANATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS 138 (D. Oehler and P.G.
Potz, eds., 1970).
2. European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments,
The Hague, 28 May 1970, E. T.S. 70. There is also a similar Benelux Convention
on the subject: Trait6 Benelux sur l'Exdcution des D6cisions Judiciaires Rendues
en Mati~re Pdnale, Brussels, 26 Sept. 1968, Union Economique Benelux, Textes de
Base, which never entered into force because of non-ratification by Luxembourg.
Id.
3. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters,
Strasbourg, 15 May 1972, E. T.S. 73. See also the Trait6 entre le Royaume de
Belgique, le Grand-Duchd de Luxembourg et le Royaume des Pays-Bas sur la
Transmission des Poursuites, Brussels, 11 May 1974, Union Economique Benelux,
Textes de Base, which never was entered into force because of non-ratification by
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longstanding principles of extradition. Even if these instruments
were ratified on a large scale,4 these instruments could never be a
complete substitute for extradition as Europe knows it.5
This does not mean, however, that extradition laws have
remained unaltered. Two recent and parallel events can be
recognized in extradition jurisprudence. First, extradition proce-
dures have become broader and more supple. Modern extradition
treaties no longer contain limited lists of extraditable offences;
instead, extradition in principle is possible for any serious offence.
Thus, traditional exceptions based on sovereignty, such as the
political or the fiscal offence exception, lose significance.
Second, the need for more intense and effective international
cooperation also leads to less rigid procedural requirements, to
more direct ways of communication, and to the simplification of
procedures.6 Thus, the mode of thinking regarding international
cooperation in criminal matters and extradition has evolved. The
traditional emphasis on state-to-state obligations allows the person
charged only the rights or safeguards granted to him or her as an
object rather than as a subject of the process. Modern extradition,
however, applies a more legal protection-oriented approach. There
is a growing awareness that the individual bears the ultimate conse-
quences of state action which has created a need for a reevaluation
of the framework and structures of international extradition law.7
These two recent evolutions in extradition law are not always
compatible. The unbridled simplification of extradition procedures
Belgium and Luxembourg.
4. Both Conventions were ratified by only five Union Member States (chart
of 2 Sept. 1996): Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.
However, the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,
Strasbourg, 21 Mar. 1983, E.T.S. 112, which deals with an aspect of the interna-
tional validity of criminal judgments (prisoner transfer) has been ratified by all
Union Member States. Id.
5. Schultz, supra note 1, at 142; A.H.J. Swart, NEDERLANDS UITLEVERINGS-
RECHT 6-8 (1986).
6. SWART, supra note 5, at 22-23.
7. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 558-559 (1974); M.C. Bassiouni, World Public Order and Extradition: A
Conceptual Evaluation, in AKTUELLE PROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN
STRAFRECHTS. BEITRAGE ZUR GESTALTUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN UND EINES
SUPRANATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS 10-18 (D. Oehler and P.G. Pbtz, eds., 1970);
S.A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in
Extradition - Striking the Balance, in PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 535 (A. Eser, et al. eds., 1992). An interesting
article on this evolution is H.G. van der Wilt, Apres Soering: The Relationship
Between Extradition and Human Rights in the Legal Practice of Germany, the
Netherlands and the United States, 42 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 53-80 (1990).
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can lead to an infringement of fundamental rights and a lack of
legal protection. Making extradition too complicated, however,
may be seen as a sign of distrust between states or may lure States
into practices such as abduction or disguised extradition. This
could lead to less protection for the requested person8 rather than
an improvement of his legal rights in the process.9 As is the case
of international criminal law, extradition should strike a balance
between the protection of society through the effective operation
of the criminal justice system and the protection of the rights of the
individual defendants and victims, and the maintenance of the rule
of law.1° Between the European Union (EU) Member States,
striking this balance has lead to close inter-state relations,1' under-
girded by the achievements of the European human rights
convention and its protocols.
This Article outlines this balancing effort by analyzing the
negotiations and achievements of the European Union in the field
of extradition. The trend towards a regional-Union approach in
criminal matters has been confirmed by Article K.1.7 of the Treaty
on European Union, which states explicitly that Member States
shall regard judicial cooperation in criminal matters as a matter of
common interest. 2 This trend remains based, however, on the
already existing bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties and
on some Conventions from the period before the entry into force
of the Treaty on European Union. 3
8. Note that this Article uses the terms "requested state," "requesting state,"
or "person charged," to signify the role of each party in the extradition process.
9. Ch. Van Den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human
Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 757-79
(1990).
10. Schomburg, The Regionalization of International Criminal Law and the
Protection of Human Rights in International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings.
Section IV of the XV Congress of The International Association of Penal Law,
IAPL, EUR. J. CRIME, GRIM. L. AND CRIM. JUST. 98-105 (1995).
11. See G. Vermeulen and T. Vander Beken, Extradition in the European
Union: State of the Art and Perspectives, EUR. J. CRIME, GRIM. L. AND CRIM.
JUST. 200-25 (1996).
12. Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 Feb. 1992, Official Journal of the
European Communities, 1992, C 191.
13. The Council of Europe, the Schengen Group, and the Benelux Economic
Union were established between the EC Member States within the scope of the
European Political Cooperation.
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II. Multilateral Extradition Treaties: The Council of Europe,
the Schengen Group, and the Benelux Economic Union
The relationship between the fifteen EU Member States in the
field of extradition is rather complicated. The basic convention
relied upon is the 1957 Council of Europe European Convention
on Extradition (ECE)."4 The ECE has been ratified by all
Member States except Belgium. However, according to Article 60
of the Schengen Convention (SC),15 the ECE is applicable bet-
ween Belgium and the other six countries where the SC has
entered into force. The relationship between Belgium and the
other EU Member States is still governed by bilateral extradition
treaties.
16
14. European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13 Dec. 1957, E.T.S. 24. See
also Resolution (75)12 on the Practical Application of the European Convention
on Extradition, Resolution (78)43 on Reservations Made to Certain Provisions on
the European Convention on Extradition, Recommendation No. R(80)7 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning the practical application of
the European Convention on Extradition, Recommendation No. R(80)9 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning extradition to states not
party to the European Convention on human rights and Recommendation No.
R(86)13 concerning the practical application of the European Convention on
extradition with respect to detention pending extradition
15. Convention d'application de l'Accord de Schengen du 14 juin 1985 entre
les Gouvemements des Etats de l'Union Economique Benelux, de la Rdpublique
f~ddrale d'Allemagne et de la Rdpublique frang-aise, relatif A la suppression
graduelle des contr6les aux frontitres communes, Schengen, Moniteur Belge, 15
Oct. 1993. Now there are ten contracting parties, seven for which the Convention
is in full application. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France,
Spain, and Portugal and three for which there is no application yet, Italy, Greece,
and Austria. Article 60 of the Convention states, among other things, that in
relations between two contracting parties, one of which is not a party to the ECE,
the provisions of the ECE shall apply.
16. Austria: Convention d'extradition entre la Belgique et l'Autriche, Vienna,
29 Mar. 1881, Moniteur Beige, 12 Apr. 1881; Denmark: Convention d'extradition
entre la Belgique et le Danemark, Copenhague, 25 Mar. 1876, Moniteur Beige, 30
Apr. 1876; Finland: Convention d'extradition et d'assistance judiciaire en mati~re
pdnal conclue entre le Royaume de Belgique et la Republique de Finlande,
Stockholm, 23 Jan. 1928, Moniteur Belge, 1 June 1928; Greece: Traitd d'extradition
entre la Belgique et la Grace, Athens, 26 June-9 July 1901, Moniteur Beige, 26
Feb. 1904; Italy: Convention d'extradition entre la Belgique et l'Italie, Rome, 15
Jan. 1875, Moniteur Beige, 10 Mar. 1875: Ireland: Trait6 entre la Belgique et le
Royaume-Unie de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande pour l'extradition r6ciproque des
criminels fugitifs, Brussels, 29 Oct. 1901, Moniteur Belge, 7 Mar. 1902; Sweden:
Convention d'extradition entre la Belgique et la Suede et la Norv6ge, Stockholm,
26 Apr. 1870, Moniteur Beige, 1 Aug. 1870 and United Kingdom: Trait6 entre la
Belgique et le Royaume-Unie de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande pour l'extradition
r6ciproque des criminels fugitifs, Brussels, 29 Oct. 1901, Moniteur Belge, 7 Mar.
1902.
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The ECE has been supplemented by two separate protocols,17
by bilateral treaties"8 (in accordance with Article 28.2 ECE), and
by the SC (Articles 59-69)."9 Extradition between the Nordic
countries' and between the United Kingdom and Ireland 21 is
partially subject to special national regulations (in accordance with
Article 28.3 ECE).22 Between the Benelux (lowland) countries,
the ECE is not applicable by virtue of special arrangements
between these countries; extradition is governed by the Benelux
Extradition Treaty (BET).2
The Council of Europe's European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism (ECST)24 is one European 25 treaty
which provides for special extradition regulations. This treaty,
which was adopted by all EU Member States, limits the application
17. Additional Protocol to the European Convention on extradition,
Strasbourg, 15 Oct. 1975, E.T.S. 86 (in force in Denmark, The Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) and Second Additional Protocol to the European
Convention on Extradition, Strasbourg, 17 Mar. 1978, E.T.S. 98 (in force in
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom: chart of signatures and ratifications of 2 Sept.
1996).
18. See the German bilateral treaties: Bundes Gesetz Blatt, 31 Jan. 1972, Ger.-
Aus., 1975 II S. 1163, 1976 II. S. 1798; Bundes Gesetz Blatt, 8 Nov. 1976, Ger.-
Den., Bundes Gesetz Blatt, 24 Oct. 1979, II S. 1827; Ger.-Italy, 1982 II S. 106; 1985
II S. 835; Bundes Gesetz Blatt, 30 Aug. 1979, Ger.-Neth. 1981 II S. 1153, 1983 II
S. 32. 'Uber die Erganzung des europdschen Auslieferungstibereinkommens vom
13. Dezember 1957 und die Erleichterung seiner Anwendung.'
19. See supra note 15.
20. See, e.g., C.F. Mulder and C.F. Rfter, Het Scandinavisch model.
Samenwerken met behoud van identiteit, 21 DELIKT EN DELINKWENT 26-29 (1995).
The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) have a
uniform law which is applicable in their mutual relations. This means that the
ECE is not applicable between these states. See Declaration of Iceland to the
ECE (20 June 1984): "The Convention shall not apply to extradition to Denmark,
Finland, Norway or Sweden as extradition between the Nordic countries is
governed by a uniform law." Id.
21. See, e.g., F. THOMAS, DE EUROPESE RECHTSHULPVERDRAGEN IN
STRAFZAKEN 161 (1980).
22. See supra note 14.
23. Traitd d'extradition et d'entraide judiciaire en mati~re p6nale entre le
Royaume de Belgique, le Grand-Duchd de Luxembourg et le Royaume des Pays-
Bas, Brussels, 27 June 1962, Union Economique Benelux, Textes de Base.
24. " European Convention on the suppression of terrorism, Strasbourg, 27 Jan.
1977, E. T.S. See also Resolution (74)3 on international terrorism and Recommen-
dation No. R(82)1 concerning international cooperation and punishment of acts
of terrorism.
25. Of course there are UN-treaties containing special extradition regulation
applicable around the world. See, e.g., The Convention on illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, MONITEUR BELGE, 21 Mar. 1996. Since they
are not "European," these treaties are not commented on in this Article.
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of the political offence exception 26 by listing a number of serious
offences that will not be considered as political offences, offences
connected with political offences, or offences inspired by political
motives.
III. European Union
A. Before the Enactment of the Treaty on European Union: A
History on the Treaties in the 1970s and 1980s
The idea of a so-called "European judicial area' 27 was
launched by France at the Brussels European Summit of 5-6
December 1977.28 Within the scope of the judicial cooperation
between the attending Member States, a working group designed
a number of draft treaties in order to establish a "European judicial
area." 29 A "European judicial area" was thought to offer more
extradition possibilities than the existing Council of Europe
structures." This ambition, however, proved to be unrealistic and
the activities of the working group reached a deadlock in the early
1980s.31 Nevertheless, they had achieved results on the subject of
the suppression of terrorism.32
On 4 December 1979, the EC Member States committed
themselves to the Dublin Agreement, a strict application of the
1977 Council of Europe ECST by all EC member states. 33 The
main goal of the Dublin Agreement was a broader utilization of the
26. Id.
27. E. Crabit, Recherches sur la notion d'espace judiciaire europ~n, Talence,
Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1988, 588, 'Espace judiciaire europdn. A
propos des troisimes journdes franqaises de droit p6nal tenues t Nice du 2 au 4
octobre 1980' Revue de Droit Pdnal (1984) 37-49; F. Thomas, "'L'espace judiciaire
europdn.' Een alibi?," 11 Delikt en Delinkwent (1981) 543.
28. R. Errera, Combating Fraud, Judicial Criminal Matters and Police Co-
operation, in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISION
327 (1995).




33. R. de Gouttes, De l'espace judiciaire penal europn di l'espace judiciaire
penal pan-europn, in MLANGES OFFERTS A GEORGES LEVASSEUR. DROIT
PINAL. DROIT EUROPIN 5 (1992); Ch. Van Den Wyngaert, De internationale
strafrechtelijke samenwerking bij de bestrijding van de E.E.G.-fraude, in DE
JURIDISCHE BESCHERMING VAN DE FINANCIFELE BELANGEN VAN DE EUROPESE
GEMEENSCHAPPEN. LA PROTECTION JURIDIQUE DES INTtRITS FINANCIERS DES
COMMUNAUTPS EUROPtNNES 81-82 (F. Tulkens, et al. eds., 1992). See also supra
note 24.
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ECST by all EC Member States.34 Through the Dublin Agree-
ment, the ECST enables the Council of Europe's Member States to
regard a number of serious, terrorism-related offences as political
offences, as offences connected with political offences, or as
offences inspired by political motives.35 For Member States, the
Dublin Agreement means that the traditional political offence
exception, as laid down in Article 3.1 ECE or Article 3 BET, would
not justify a refusal of extradition in the case of terrorist acts as
established in Articles 1-2 ECST.36 According to Article 13
ECST, however, any State is allowed to declare that it reserves the
right to refuse extradition with respect to any Article 1 offence on
account of the political offence exception, provided that particularly
serious aspects of the offence37 are taken into due consideration
when evaluating the character of the offence.38 In accordance
with the provisions of Article 13, over half 9 of the EU Member
States, all of them having ratified the ECST, have (at least
partially) reserved the right to refuse extradition to an offence that
is considered a political offence.'
The 1979 Dublin Agreement aimed at undoing this ambiguous
situation. Member States who reserved the right to refuse
extradition in accordance with Article 13 of the ECST must, under
the Dublin Agreement, explicitly declare whether they wish to
make use of this reservation in their relations with other Member
States.41 Parties are thus encouraged not to reiterate the reserva-
tions they made with respect to the extradition obligation for
terrorism-related offences.42  Nevertheless, the four Member
States which ratified the Dublin Agreement confirmed the
reservations they made under Art. 13 of the ECST. This, however,
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 14, 23, and 25.
37. This includes the fact that it created a collective danger to the life, physical
integrity or liberty of persons, or that it affected persons foreign to the motives
behind it, or that cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of the
offence. See supra note 24.
38. Id.
39. Id. Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy,
and Sweden. Id.
40. Id.
41. de Gouttes, supra note 33.
42. Id.
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was not enough for the Dublin Agreement to be enacted;
4 3
therefore, the Agreement had very little surplus value.
In addition to the Dublin Agreement, the "European judicial
area" activities lead to a draft Convention Between the Member
States of the European Communities on the Cooperation in
Criminal Matters.' This draft Convention45 dealt largely with
extradition.46 The draft was finished in June 1980, but failed after
the Netherlands refused to sign it.47 The idea of the "European
judicial area" has not been revisited.
At the end of the 1980s, a working group called "Judicial
Cooperation" was formed under the intergovernmental framework
of the so-called European Political Cooperation. : This group
continued the goals of the "European judicial area. 48  Through
the working group, treaties49 have been completed in the area of
cooperation in criminal matters between the twelve EC Member
States. 50 Most of these treaties are merely application conventions
43. Id. Nine ratifications are necessary for the entry into force of the Dublin
Agreement and there have only been ratifications by Belgium, The Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and Italy. Id.
44. THOMAS, supra note 21, at 546-48; Ch. Van Den Wyngaert, Euroterrorisme
en "espace judiciaire europdn:" de fundamentele rechten van het individu in het
gedrang?, 43 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 2675-92 (1980).
45. Ch. Van Den Wyngaert, Het "Europees rechtsgebied (espace judiciaire
europ~n): naar een tweespalt binnen de Raad van Europa? Enkele beschouwingen
n.a.v. het Verdrag tussen de lid-staten van de Europese Gemeenschappen betreffende
samenwerking in strafzaken (juni 1980) en de betekenis ervan voor de rechtsbescher-
Ming van het individu, 45 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1206-07 (1982).
46. The Convention was drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty
on European Union, relating to extradition between the Member States of the
European Union, Dublin, 27 Sept. 1996, Official Journal of the European
Communities, C 313/12, 23 Oct. 1996. The draft convention contained some
aspects that were also discussed in the negotiations of the Convention of 27 Sept.
1996, relating to extradition between the EU Member States.
47. THOMAS, supra note 21. See also de Gouttes, supra note 33.
48. Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 33, at 81. See supra notes 27-32.
49. Agreement on the application, between the EC Member States, of the
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons, Brussels, 25 May 1987;
Convention on the application of the principle "ne bis in idem," Brussels, 25 May
1987; Agreement on the simplification and modernization of methods of
transmitting extradition requests, Donostia - San Sebastian, 26 May 1989;
Agreement on the transfer of criminal proceedings, Rome, 6 Nov. 1990;
Convention on the execution of foreign criminal judgments, The Hague, 13 Nov.
1991.
50. The application of these treaties has been extended to all fifteen EU
Member States. When Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union,
they undertook to accede to those which, by date of accession have been opened
for signature by the then present Member States. This principle is in Article 3 of
the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the
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of the judicial cooperation treaties of the Council of Europe. 1
Ireland did not sign the Agreement and the three new Member
States have not acceded until recently. 2
B. The Treaty on European Union and Beyond: European
Extradition Law in the 1990s
1. Background.-The rules of inter-governmental cooperation
on extradition matters between the Member-States of the European
Union in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were
established in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of
7 February 1992."3 Title VI, which contains Article K of the
Treaty, is referred to as the "Third Pillar of the European
Union."54 As was previously mentioned, Article K.1.7 states that
the Member States shall regard judicial cooperation in criminal
matters as a matter of common interest.55 Article K.1.7 provides
the Member States with a new institutional framework.56 Until
Article K.1.7. judicial cooperation had been discussed only in work
groups within the European Political Cooperation. On 28
September 1993, the European Ministers of Justice adopted a
declaration on the subject of extradition at a meeting in Limelette
(Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) (Limelette Declaration).5"
The Limelette Declaration contained a detailed mandate for a
technical work group59 which was to develop specific instruments
to modernize extradition.'
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden and the
adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded. Official
Journal of the European Communities, C 241/21, 29 August 1994.
51. See supra note 49 in its entirety.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 12.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. J.J.E. Schutte, Europese samenwerking inzake justitie en veiligheid. De
wordingsgeschiedenis en betekenis van de bepalingen inzake justitie en binnenlandse
zaken in het Unieverdrag van Maastricht, 13 PANOPTICON 540-42 (1992).
58. Id.
59. Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 Nov. 1993, this
working group is situated in Title VI of the Treaty, in the Steering Group III
(Judicial Cooperation).
60. D. Flore & R. Troosters, Maastricht in Beweging. Enkele bedenkingen na
het Belgisch Voorzitterschap van de Europese Unie, 15 PANOPTICON 311-15 (1994);
A.M. Rouchaud, Convention relative d la procedure simplifige d'extradition entre
les ltats Membres de l'Union Europdnne, 3 AGON 3 (1995).
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Shortly thereafter, at the European Council of 29-30 October
1993 in Brussels, an extraordinary session was held to prepare the
entry of the TEU into force.6' It was stated that the policy of the
EU on sensitive matters, such as JHA, should provide citizens with
assurances that the creation of a judicial area without frontiers
would not be achieved at the expense of their security.62 Instead,
security would be guaranteed more effectively in the future due to
systematic and well-organized cooperation between the Member
States. 63  The European Council asked that the JHA Council
prepare an action-plan covering several aspects of the JHA for
their December meeting, including talks on the strengthening of
judicial cooperation, particularly in the area of extradition.'
As a result, the JHA Council of 29-30 November 1993
immediately set up the working structures referred to in the
European Union Treaty and drew up a detailed action plan
regarding judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This plan
stressed the need to give special attention to the task of improving
existing extradition arrangements. 65 The plan was a consolidation
of the former Limelette Declaration and aimed at giving expression
to the Member States' common desire to relax the conditions and
political grounds for refusing extradition.66 This was approved by
the European Council of 10-11 December 1993.67
This plan has served as a key for negotiations and decision
making on extradition under the "Third Pillar., 61 It reflects the
commitment of the Member States to improve judicial cooperation
in the struggle against crime, in the areas of judicial proceedings,
and the execution of sentences. 69 Improving the existing extradi-
tion practice between the Member States was therefore considered
a high priority.7"
According to the plan, methods to relax the conditions for
extradition and to make extradition procedures more efficient
61. Rouchard, supra note 60, at 3-4.
62. Bulletin of the European Communities, 10 (1993), point 1.5, at 9; see also
Council of the European Union, 10655/93 JAI 11, 2 Dec. 1993, 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bulletin of the European Communities, 11 (1993), point 1.5.1, at 93; see also
Council of the European Union, 10655/93 JAI 11, 2 December 1993, at 1, 14.
66. Council of the European Union, 10655/93 JAI 11, 2 Dec. 1993, 14.
67. Id.
68. Bulletin of the European Communities, 11 (1993), point 1.5.1, at 93.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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needed to be examined.71 However, these methods would not be
examined unless the European Convention on the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the national laws
of the Member States were observed.72 Basic conditions and
grounds for refusal of extradition were subject to thorough
examination. Reservations made by the Member States at the time
of the ratification of the 1957 ECE had to be taken into account
for the plan to work.73  Any relaxation of the conditions of
extradition had to consider issues such as the imprisonment
threshold and extraditable offences in general, also including the
political offence exception, tax offences, lapse of time, extradition
of nationals, and the speciality rule.74
When examining extradition procedures with a view towards
making them more efficient, the JHA Council recommended that
a number of measures be considered. Those measures included
simplification of judicial control on the admissibility of extradition,
simplification of political (governmental) intervention in the
extradition decision, and simplification of procedures where the
person concerned consents to his extradition.75
At the JHA Council of 23 March 1994, there was consensus
between the Member States on a number of provisions. 76 Agree-
ment was reached on the acceptance of a minimum threshold
imprisonment of at least one year in the requesting state and at
least six months in the requested state, on the extradition for fiscal
offences concerning excise, value added tax and customs duties, and
on the abolition of the speciality rule, especially when the person
concerned consents to extradition.77 However, on the issue of
abolishing the political exception and the extradition of nationals,
there was disagreement. A majority of the delegations argued that
a political debate should be held on these subjects.
78
Later, during discussions on the issue of "simplified extradi-
tion" at the JHA Council of 30 November and 1 December
71. Bulletin of the European Communities, 11 (1993), point 1.5.9, at 95; see also
Council of the European Union, 10655/93 JAI 11, 2 Dec. 1993, 14.




76. Council of the European Union, 5366/94, 7 Mar. 1994, JUSTPEN 13, 2-3.
77. Id.
78. Council of the European Union, 5366/94, 7 Mar. 1994, JUSTPEN 13, 2-3;
Tweede Kamer (the Netherlands), 1993-1994, 23 490, n.9, at 4.
1997]
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1994, 79 it became clear that all delegations could agree on a text
on simplified procedure. Because of this consensus, it seemed
expedient to write any provisions on simplified extradition in a
separate convention.'0 Further, as negotiations on a general treaty
on the improvement of extradition between the Member States
were expected to take some time, the delegations to the JHA
Council wanted to make sure that at least a text would be adopted
on the subject of simplified extradition. On 10 March 1995, the
JHA Council finally drew up the Convention on Simplified
Extradition Procedure Between the Member States of the
European Union. The Convention was signed by the EU Member
States on the same day.
81
Discussions on other extradition procedures were continued,
with the goal of drawing up a separate and general Convention on
Improvement of Extradition between the Member States. 2 On 23
November 1995, the Council adopted conclusions by examining and
recognizing the progress gained by adopting such a Convention and
by consolidating existing agreements with regard to extraditable
offences and tax offences.83 They also created guidelines for the
further examination of issues such as the exclusion of the political
nature of offences as grounds for refusing extradition and the
relaxing of the double criminality rule.'
In the Spring of 1996, a fragile compromise on the relaxation
of the double criminality rule 5 and the political offence exception
seemed possible.86 On 27 September 1996, an agreement was re-
ached on the Convention Relating to Extradition between the
Member States of the European Union.'
2. The Convention on Simplified Procedure.-The Conven-
tion on Simplified Procedure Between the Member States of the
79. Tweede Kamer (the Netherlands), 1994-1995, 23 490, nr. 20, at 5.
80. Id.
81. See also General Report EU, 1995, 385 and Council of the European
Union, 11795/95, 17 Nov. 1995, JUSTPEN 159, 1-2. In the meantime, Denmark




85. Council of the European Union, 5288/96, JUSTPEN 26.
86. Staten-generaal (the Netherlands), 1995-1996, 23 490, nrs. 90e en 43, 2;
Council of the European Union, 5288/96, JUSTPEN 26.
87. Tweede Kamer (The Netherlands), 1994-1995, 23 490, nr. 20, at 5.
1 NEW CONVENTIONS ON EXTRADITION
European Union (Convention on Simplified Extradition),8 drawn
up on the basis of Article K.3.2(c) TEU and signed on 10 March
1995, was the first Convention to be adopted under Title VI of the
Union Treaty.89 It clearly follows the aforementioned Limelette
statement on extradition adopted by the November 1993 JHA
Council.'
During talks on the Convention on Simplified Extradition, it
was stated that, in addition to the simplification and modernization
of the communication of extradition requests and documents, a
relaxation of judicial control could also improve the extradition
procedure in general.91 Most of the delegations considered a
complete abolition of judicial control as unfeasible, but were willing
to accept the possibility of direct extradition between the compe-
tent authorities for prosecution or execution. However, the person
claimed had to give consent to an independent authority who
controlled the extradition conditions.92 This measure would not
only simplify the procedure but would also meet the interests of the
person claimed. Statistics indicate that in more than thirty percent
of the cases, the person concerned consents to his extradition.93
In spite of this consent, the procedure can still last several
months.94 The procedure is automatically stayed unless the person
claimed has been surrendered to the authorities of the requesting
state.95 If this delay is the result of due process problems, the
delay is acceptable. However, if the person concerned consents,
such long delays are not justifiable.96 Thus, it is clear that in case
of consent, a simplified procedure reducing extradition formalities
would accelerate the extradition procedure without jeopardizing the
legal position of the person concerned.97
88. Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 33, at 81, as well as: Explanatory Report,
Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60; Bulletin
of the European Union, 3 (1995), at 85; X., Internationaal strafrecht, 25 DD 901-03
(1995); Errera, supra note 28, at 334-35.
89. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60.
90. See supra note 61.
91. Council of the European Union, 7456/94,14 June 1994, JUSTPEN 41, 9-10.
92. Id.
93. These figures have been given by the Member States and relate to the
total amount of EU extraditions and the average duration of the inter-state
procedures. In 1992 there have been approximately 700 EU extraditions.
94. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60, 3;
see also Rouchaud, supra note 60, at 3..
95. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60, 3.
96. Rouchard, supra note 60, at 3-4.
97. G. VERMEULEN, ET AL., INTERNATIONALE SAMENWERKING IN STRAFZA-
KEN EN RECHTSBESCHERMING 226-27 (1995).
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The ECE does not contain a provision allowing simplified
procedure with consent. However, the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe stressed the value of such a provision.9" In
Recommendation R (80)7,99 the Committee urges the Member
States' governments to implement such a provision "with a view to
expediting extradition and keeping the period of provisional arrest
as short as possible,. . . [using] a summary procedure enabling the
rapid surrender of the person sought without following ordinary
extradition procedures, provided that the person concerned
consents to it.'1°°
Indeed, Article 66 of the SC already introduced an "informal"
extradition procedure with the consent of the person concerned as
a supplement to the ECE 10 Moreover, the Benelux countries
had Article 19 of the BET, which provided an analogous proce-
dure.102 In the European judicial area negotiations, the matter
has been discussed between the Member States (Article 10 of the
above-mentioned 1980 draft Convention on the cooperation in
criminal matters). 3 The fact that the subject has been reintro-
duced after the TEU is a positive evolution.°4
3. The Convention on Simplified Extradition and the
Procedures on Simplified Extradition in the Schengen Convention,
and the Benelux Extradition Treaty.-Under the simplified
extradition procedure as provided for in the Simplified Extradition
Convention of 10 March 1995, Member States are to surrender to
one another those persons sought for the purpose of extradition, as
long as these persons give consent and the requested state
agrees.105 The consent of the arrested or wanted person must be
given under circumstances which afford him or her sufficient legal
guarantees. The agreement of the competent authority of the
requested state must also be given in accordance with its national
procedures.'06
98. Id.
99. Recommendation R(80)7 concerning the practical application of the
European Convention on extradition, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on
27 June 1980.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 23.
103. Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 45, at 1206.
104. See supra note 12.
105. See supra note 81, at Art. 2.
106. Id. at Art. 5.
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The Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure of March
19951°7 focuses on those situations in which the provisional arrest
of the requested person is asked for or a report is made in the
Schengen Information System in accordance with Article 95 of the
SC."~ First, the arrested person consents within 10 days after his
provisional arrest. 1°9 The requested state shall then immediately
notify the requesting state of the consent of the claimed person.11 °
If no consent is given within this 10-day period, the requesting state
shall submit a request for extradition according to the normal
procedure."' Taking into account the delays of Article 16.4 of
the ECE, the requesting state then has a minimum of eight and a
maximum of 30 days112 in which to produce an official extradition
request.' 3 The person concerned may, however, give his consent
after this first 10-day period, as long as no official request for
extradition has been received. If the requested state agrees, the
person concerned can give his consent even after receipt of the
request for extradition."4 Next to this, Member States may use
the simplified procedure when there has been no request for
provisional arrest and when the person claimed consents after
receipt of the official extradition request.
15
In any case, within 20 days after the person claimed has given
his consent, the decision pursuant to the simplified procedure shall
be made available to the requesting state. Within 20 days after this
notification, surrender shall take place, except when prevented by
circumstances beyond the control of the requested state.' 16 The
total duration of this simplified procedure, from the date of the
107. Id. at Art(s). 3-11.
108. Explanatory Report, Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July
1995, JUSTPEN 60, 6; see also Rouchaud, supra note 60, at 4.
109. See supra Explanatory Report, note 108, at 6.
110. Id. But see contra: Rouchaud, supra note 60, at 5. Rouchaud states that
the consent of the person, that can be given immediately, should be notified to the
requested state within 10 days.
111. Supra note 108.
112. Id. But see contra: Explanatory Report, Council of the European Union,
6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60, 11; see also Rouchaud, supra note 60, at 5.
113. Article 16.4 ECE: "Provisional arrest may be terminated if, within a period
of 18 days after arrest, the requested Party has not received the request for
extradition and the documents mentioned in Article 12. It shall not, in any event,
exceed 40 days from the date of such arrest." Id.
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provisional arrest to the date of surrender, shall not exceed 50
days.'
17
When compared to the Benelux situation, it appears that
chances have been missed in the Convention on Simplified
Procedure of March 1995. According to Article 19 of the BET, the
surrender of the person concerned must take place within five days
and within 18 days after the provisional arrest.118 Considering the
current possibilities of telecommunication and transport, the EU
period of 50 days seems extremely long. It appears as though the
simplified procedure found in the EU Convention of 10 March
1995 is aimed primarily at avoiding formal extradition procedures
and at saving the judicial, ministerial, or diplomatic authorities
time-consuming and complex procedures.
Addressing questions concerning the range of the consent of
the arrested or claimed person is essential.1 9 In all cases where
the person consents, this consent implies consent with a surrender
to the requesting state." In some cases, however, his consent
also implies a renunciation to the Speciality Rule.' This is the
case when the requested state has declared, that the rules laid down
in Article 14 of the ECE on speciality do not apply: 1. when the
person consents to extradition (Rule of Article 19 of the BET),122
or 2. when the person consents to speciality extradition and
117. X., Internationaal strafrecht, 25 DD 903 (1995). According to the original
Belgian proposal on the simplified procedure, surrender had to take place within
18 days after the day of the provisional arrest, and, if the surrender did not take
place within 8 days, the requesting state was invited to send an extradition request
according to Article 12 of the ECE. This proposal was very similar to Article 19
of the BET, where a surrender within 5 (not 8) days after the provisional arrest
is provided. The other delegations could not agree. France, for example,
proposed a prolongation of the surrender period to 40 days after the provisional
arrest. The United Kingdom added that the starting point of the delay should not
be the day of the provisional arrest, but the day of the consent of the person
claimed. Finally, these proposals have been approved: surrender shall take place
within 40 days (20 days for the notification of the extradition decision and 20 days
for the surrender) after the consent of the person concerned, given within 10 days
after his provisional arrest.
118. See supra note 23.
119. Id. at Article 9. See also Explanatory Report, Council of the European
Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60, 10.
120. See supra note 23, at Art. 9.
121. Id.
122. The consent to the informal surrender implies automatically, according to
Article 19 of the BET, the non-application of the.rule of speciality, so that the
person concerned, after his surrender, can be prosecuted and punished for all sorts
of offences. The initial Belgian proposal on the simplified procedure contained
such provisions as well.
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expressly renounces his entitlement to the Rule (Rule of Article
6 6 .2 ).l"l Further, there are occasions when consent and renuncia-
tion of entitlement to the Speciality Rule may not be revoked
under the SC. 24
As immediate surrender often times automatically implies
renunciation of entitlement to the Speciality Rule or renders the
declaration irrevocable, it is essential that the arrested or claimed
person has the right to legal counsel during the simplified proce-
dure."2 This is guaranteed by Article 19 the BET and Article 66
of the SC.126 The Convention on Simplified Extradition 27 pro-
vides this right to legal counsel."2  Further, this Convention on
Simplified Extradition stipulates that the consent or the express
renunciation of entitlement to the Speciality Rule must be estab-
lished in a manner which shows that the person concerned has
expressed it voluntarily and intelligently. 29 Consent and renunci-
ation must be given before a competent judicial authority of the
requested state." ° This authority may be a judge, a court, or a
prosecution officer, depending upon the declaration of the
concerned Member State to the Convention.'
During the talks surrounding the Convention on Simplified
Extradition Procedure, the simplification of political control of
extradition between Member States was also discussed. 32 Most
Member States did not want an extradition procedure without a
governmental decision.1 33  However, in cases of consent, an
exception seemed acceptable."M The initial Belgian Draft Con-
123. According to Article 66.2 of the SC, the person claimed can only renounce
entitlement to the speciality rule by an explicit declaration. Id.
124. Member States may however indicate, in a declaration, that consent and
renunciation may be revoked, in accordance with the rules applicable under
national law.
125. See supra note 119.
126. Id.




131. Id. According to the BET, the consent should be given before a public
prosecution officer. In the SC, consent is to be given before a member of the
judiciary (not further described). See Circulaire ministdrielle relative 4 l'extradition
et d l'entraide judiciaire en matiere penale entre les 6tats parties 6 la convention
d'application de l'accord de Schengen du 19 juin 1990, MONITEUR BELGE, 15775,
2 June 1995.
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vention on Extradition with Consent provided for a direct surren-
der between the judicial authorities of the Member States, without
any formal governmental or ministerial decisions. 35 This "direct
surrender" regulation was very similar to Article 19 of the BET,
which created a summary extradition procedure between the
Benelux states.1
36
According to both Article 66 of the SC and Article 10 of the
Convention on Simplified Extradition, a formal intervention of
competent authorities of the requested state is still necessary.
37
In the Convention on Simplified Extradition, the authority of the
requesting state shall notify the authority of the requested state of
its decision to use the simplified procedure.13  This means that
there is a "simplified" procedure, not an actual "summary" proce-
dure.
139
In the enactment of the Convention on Simplified Extradi-
tion,"' the same principle was applied as in the European Politi-
cal Cooperation Agreements between the Member States of the
late 1980s. 4' In general, the Convention on Simplified Extradi-
tion shall become effective only 90 days after the date of deposit of
the instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval by the last
Member State to do so. However, enactment on a bilateral basis
may be anticipated because any Member State may declare that the
Convention shall apply in its relations with other Member States
that have made the same declaration. 42
It is unclear which of the already existing conventions
governing the relations between certain EU Member States are
supplemented by the Convention on Simplified Extradition.
According to Article 1, this Convention exists to supplement and
facilitate the application of the 1957 ECE. The Convention does
135. Id.
136. Id. See also supra note 23.
137. See Article 5 of the Convention which also states that the competent
authority of the requested state shall give its agreement in accordance with its
national procedures. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995,
JUSTPEN 60, Art. 5.
138. Id.
139. Regarding the difference see in detail: Circulaire ministgrielle du 24 avril
1995 relative dl l'extradition et d l'entraide judiciaire en matiere penale entre les 6tats
parties d la convention d'application de l'accord de Schengen du 19 juin 1990,
MONITEUR BELGE 15775, 2 June 1995. The Dutch translation of the Convention
of 10 March is rather poor where it refers to a 'summary' procedure.
140. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60,
Art. 16.
141. See supra note 36.
142. This includes 90 days after the deposit of its declaration.
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not modify the extradition regulation adopted in other instruments
which are in force between Member States, such as the BET 4' or
the SC. One reason for this limitation is that both the BET and
the SC already contain a summary or simplified procedure.
Therefore, there is no reason to supplement Article 19 of the
BET or Article 66 of the SC. However, it is unfortunate that only
a supplement to the ECE was opted for since the Convention of 27
September 1996 supplemented the ECE, the BET, and the SC.1"
As mentioned above, the Convention on Simplified Extradition
allows the simplified procedure to apply after receipt of the
extradition request or even without any request for provisional
arrest at all.145 This is an important and welcome extension to
the simplified procedure, which traditionally applied only in cases
of provisional arrest and before the receipt of the extradition
request. 46 Further, Article 19 of the BET has been supplement-
ed with Article 66 of the SC, offering more possibilities for the
Schengen countries. Consequently, the simplified procedure may
be used between these countries under the same circumstances
provided for in the Convention on Simplified Extradition. 47
However, Article 66 of the SC has been formulated in a very
vague way, often obstructing regular control over the course of
applying the simplified procedure. The Convention on Simplified
Extradition, on the contrary, contains clear rules and strict
guarantees, making this Convention very attractive.148 However,
since it does not aim at supplementing the BET or the SC, the
enactment of the Convention on Simplified Extradition could
create an inequality between the Benelux, or even all Schengen
countries, and the other Member States. Such a situation would be
far from satisfactory. A general rationalization of the simplified
procedure in the European Union, with a possible preservation of
more favourable bilateral or multilateral regulation, would most
likely have been more ideal than the Convention on Simplified
Extradition.
149
143. Explanatory Report, Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July
1995, JUSTPEN 60, 5.
144. The September Convention dealt with extradition between EU Member
States. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.




149. Convention, 10 Mar. 1995, art. 1.2. In the case of a presumed application
of the Convention between the Benelux-countries, the more favourable regime of
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The goal of simplified procedures with the consent of the
person claimed may be considered very positive. This is also true
for the guarantees found in the Convention on Simplified Extradi-
tion and for its clear rules with regard to delays and procedures.
However, the automatic or quasi-automatic renunciation of
entitlement to the principle of speciality clearly represents a
considerable regression. 5 '
At the start of the negotiations for the Convention on
Simplified Extradition, the delegations had agreed that it should be
possible to renounce entitlement to the Speciality Rule, while at the
same time consenting to extradition would provide that the
renunciation and consent procedures would take place separate-
ly.151 However, the Member States have currently changed their
opinion on this important issue; this is unfortunate. The consent to
surrender of the person concerned may not be assimilated with a
spontaneous decision to go to the requesting state. The consent
has no meaning other than that the person concerned renounces
the formalities of a normal extradition procedure. 52 However,
it certainly should not imply a complete renunciation of protection
by the Speciality Rule.
Any "spontaneous" character of the renunciation of entitle-
ment to the Speciality Rule should be examined closely. Most
present-day judicial systems strictly adhere to the protection
guaranteed by the Speciality Rule, even when the person concerned
consents to its violation.153 Under the Speciality Rule, only the
requested state can consent to prosecution of the surrendered
person for offences committed prior to his surrender other than
those subject to the extradition request. 5 However, the over-
zealous attitude within the European Union towards a strict
connection between the consent of the person concerned, a
simplified and informal extradition procedure, and the renunciation
of entitlement to the speciality rule, does not meet the standards
aimed for in the early negotiations in the Convention on Simplified
Extradition. It appears as though the current main goal is not to
improve the legal position of the person concerned, but rather to
the simplified procedure could be preserved without any special formal political
decision.
150. Errera, supra note 28, at 329.
151. Council No. 7456/94, 14 June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN 9-10.
152. A. ZAVRI, LE PRINCIPE DE LA SPICIALITt DE L'EXTRADITION Au
REGARD DES DROrrs DE L'HOMME 38-39 (1992).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 40-41.
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prevent the normal preliminary control over certain basic rules such
as (ne bis in idem, non-discrimination) and extradition conditions.
IV. General Procedural Improvement Within Extradition
Other extradition 'procedures, in addition to the simplified
procedure, are in need of improvement. The EU Member States'
delegations have discussed the admissibility of extradition requests
and especially the basic conditions and grounds for refusal of
extradition. Procedural aspects have been considered as well. 55
However, most of these topics have been inserted in the Conven-
tion Relating to Extradition between the EU-Member States of 27
September 1996.
A. Transmission of Extradition Requests and Supporting
Documents
According to Article i2.1 of the ECE, extradition requests
should be communicated through diplomatic channels; however,
other means of communication may be arranged between two or
more parties.516 Indeed, the Second Additional Protocol to the
ECE (Article 5), the BET (Article 11.1) and the SC (Article 65.1)
state that requests for extradition, can be sent by the relevant
Ministry of the requesting party to the relevant Ministry of the
requested party.'57 The 1989 Agreement between the EC Mem-
ber States on the Simplification and Modernization of Methods of
Transmitting Extradition Requests creates the additional possibility
of sending these requests by fax. 58  Direct communication
between competent judicial authorities is not possible, but it has
been suggested that such communication should be accepted for
requests for supplementary information. 59
The Agreement Between the Member States of the European
Communities on the Simplification and Modernization of Methods
of Transmitting Extradition Requests (Telefax Agreement) should
155. Id. The transmission of extradition documents and the duration of
national procedures or provisional arrest have been presented.
156. See supra note 14.
157. See supra notes 14, 15, and 23.
158. The Convention of 27 Sept. 1996 Relating to Extradition Between the
Member States of the European Union incorporates the text of this "Telefax
Agreement." See infra note 160.
159. Council No. 7891/94, 16 June 1994, 42 JUSTPEN. Convention on
Improvement of Extradition, art. 11. Council No. 7753/96, 30 May 1996,
JUSTPEN 77. Convention Relating to Extradition Between the Member States
of the European Union, 27 Sept. 1996, art. 14.
19971
286 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2
be mentioned when discussing extradition."6 According to the
Telefax Agreement, each Member State shall designate a central
authority in some way overseeing the transmission and reception of
extradition requests and the necessary supporting documents, as
well as any other official correspondence relating to extradition
requests.161  The Member States that ratified the Agreement
designated that their respective Ministry of Justice departments be
the central authority.162 The introduction of present-day transmis-
sion techniques is critical in the domain of judicial cooperation in
criminal matters: extradition requests and the accompanying
documents need to be sent by fax.' 6 Therefore, the central
authorities must be equipped with a fax machine that must be
equipped with a cryptographic device."6 Further, in order to
ensure the authenticity and confidentiality of transmissions, this
device should be in operation only when the equipment is being
used for the Agreement's purposes. 65 To guarantee the authenti-
city of extradition documents, the central authority of the reques-
ting Member State must declare in its request that it certifies the
faxed documents and shall describe the pagination."6 Whenever
authenticity is disputed, the production of original documents
within a reasonable time period through traditional channels may
be required. 67
It is remarkable that the above-mentioned 1989 Agreement
contains no provisions on the communication of requests for
provisional arrest."6 Since these requests can be communicated
directly to the competent judicial authorities, communication by fax
should be possible.
169
160. As was already mentioned, this agreement was signed at Donostia - San
Sebastian on 26 May 1989. The text has been published in Tractatenblad van het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1990, No. 97, 6. See also de Gouttes, supra note 33,
at 12; R. Koering-Joulin, L'entraide judiciaire r9pressive au sein de l'Union
Europenne, in QUELLE POLITIQUE PINALE POUR L'EUROPE? 182-83 (M. Delnas-
Marty, ed., 1993).






167. Tractatenblad, supra note 160.
168. The "European judicial area" draft Treaty between the Member States of
the European Communities on the cooperation in criminal matters, contains a
contrary provision on the subject. See art. 8(3). See Van Den Wyngaert, supra
note 45, at 1206.
169. VERMEULEN ET. AL., supra note 97, at 223 n.436.
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The Telefax Agreement has also found its way into the new
European Union instruments. The Convention relating to
extradition of 27 September 1996 repeats verbatim the text of the
Agreement.1 70
B. The Time Period of Extradition Procedures
Although the formal process of an extradition request is not
too complicated, extradition procedures themselves are often
lengthy. Therefore, some delegations have proposed measures that
would reduce the length of extradition procedures." However,
a consensus on a maximum length has not been found.
172
C. Duration of Provisional Arrest
Article 16.4 of the ECE states that provisional arrest may be
terminated if, within a period of 18 days after arrest, the requested
party has not received the request for extradition and the necessary
documents. 173 In any event, the arrest cannot exceed 40 days.174
Within the EU, there have been two different proposals on the
matter. The first proposal eliminates the first 18-day period and
provides a 40-day period that ends when the request and the
documents arrive in the requested State.175 This proposal is less
strict than the ECE-provisions because it provides a time limit only
for the arrival of the request.176 The proposal therefore makes it
possible that the total duration of the provisional arrest will exceed
40 days.177 The second proposal is even less protective for the
person concerned because it only states that the detention 'can' be
terminated after 40 days.17  Finally, there were no provisions on
this subject inserted in the Convention Relating to Extradition of
27 September 1996.179
170. See supra note 158.
171. The Germans submitted a proposal of six months. Council No. 7871/94,
16 June 1994, 42 JUSTPEN. Council No. 11701/94, 8 Dec. 1994, 81 JAI 76
PVICONS. This proposal was for a period of nine months. Id.
172. German proposal; Council of the European Union, 7871/94, JUSTPEN 42,
16 June 1994. Council of the European Union, 7871/94, JUSTPEN 42, 16 June
1994.
173. See supra note 14.
174. Id.
175. Council No. 7871/94, 16 June 1994, JUSTPEN 42, 13.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Council No. 8489/95, 26 June 1995, 97 JUSTPEN.
179. See id.
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D. The Enactment Relationship With Other Conventions
The enactment of the Convention Relating to Extradition of
27 September 1996 is governed by an analogous principle to that
applied in the Convention on Simplified Extradition.18 ° This
principle holds that enactment shall be 90 days after the last
Member State has notified the Secretary-General of the Council of
the European Union of the completion of the constitutional
procedures for the adoption of the convention."' Nevertheless,
enactment is possible in the bilateral relationship of the Member
States that have declared that the Convention shall apply to its
relations with Member States that have made the same declara-
tions.'8
The Convention on Simplified Extradition aims at facilitating
the extradition procedures between the EU Member States of the
ECE, by supplementing its provisions (Article 1.1).183 The
Convention of 27 September 1996 supplements the ECE, the BET,
the SC, and the ECST.'8 The Convention of 27 September 1996
does not adversely affect favourable provisions in bilateral or
multilateral agreements.8 5 It also does not affect extradition on
the basis of a uniform law providing for its execution in a Member
State's territory or arrest warrants issued in the territory of another
Member State. 6
The Convention on Simplified Extradition states that it shall
apply only to requests submitted after the day on which it was
enacted between the requested and the requesting state (Article
16.5).1" The Convention of 27 September 1996 contains a similar
provision (Article 18.5).188
180. Id. See also Council of the Eurpoean Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995,
JUSTPEN 60.
181. Id.
182. See Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60.
183. Id.
184. The reference to the ECST has been subject of much discussion. It was
first included in the Council 6829/95 of 2 May 1995, however,.it was then left out
Council 8489/95 of 26 June 1995, but it was finally included again in Council
5288/96 of 26 Feb. 1996. See supra note 158.
185. See supra note 158.
186. Id.
187. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60,
Art. 16.5.
188. In the first instance, there had been a proposal to include a provision
allowing the Member States to make a declaration allowing this principal to only
apply to requests with regard to Articles 1-2 ECST or to conspiracy and
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E. Extraditable Offences
The extraditional threshold and the Double Criminality Rule
have been debated in the negotiations within the European
Union.189
In the requesting state and the requested state, the extradi-
tional threshold is set at one year of imprisonment in Article 2.1 of
the ECE and at six months by Article 2.1 of the BET."9 The
Convention of 27 September 1996, however, lowered the threshold
in the requested state to six months (Article 2.1).191 Initially all
delegations to the Convention of 27 September 1996, were willing,
in accordance with the arrangement between the Benelux countries,
to uniformly lower the threshold in the requesting state to six
months."9 Finally, they chose to maintain a higher threshold of
12 months.193 This was a good decision because allowing extradi-
tion for minor offences would not improve the relations between
the EU Member States.194
The Double Criminality Rule has been debated frequently.
Initially, to make the absence of double criminality only an optional
ground for refusal195 or to allow extradition for facts only punish-
able in the requesting state was considered.1 96 Later, a complete
abolition of the Double Criminality Rule (as far as the facts on
association to commit offences. See Council No. 7753/95, of 30 May 1996, 77
JUSTPEN 2-4. 'The present text is very clear and can avoid problems with regard
to the applicability of treaties. G. Vermeulen & T. Vander Beken, Uitlevering van
Basken aan Spanje: juridische bedenkingen bij een politieke zaak 9 RECENTE
ARRESTEN VAN DE RAAD VAN STATE 221-27(1995). In this context the joint
declaration of the Belgian and the Spanish government of 24 Sept. 1996 should be
mentioned. This declaration states that both countries will ratify the Convention
of 27 Sept. 1996 in the near future and will make use of the possibility of Article
18.4 of this Convention to enable the anticipated enactment of the Convention in
their bilateral relationship.
189. See generally Flore & Troosters, supra note 60, at 312-13.
190. See supra notes 14 and 23.
191. See supra note 158. More fundamental proposals to drop all requirements
regarding a minimum threshold in the requested state and to require only that the
facts concerned are punishable there with some form of penalty or are at least
subject to administrative sanctions, have not been accepted.
192. See Council No. 7456/94, 14 June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN 2-4.
193. Id.
194. For this reason the UK mainly opposed the proposal to reduce the
threshold, both in the requested and the requesting state to six months. See
Council No. 7456/94, 14 June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN 2-4.
195. Flore & Troosters, supra note 60, at 313.
196. See, e.g., Council No. 8489/95, 26 June 1995, 97 JUSTPEN 4 (Proposal for
a draft Convention on Improvement of Extradition).
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which the request is based, are classifiable under the law of the
requesting state as conspiracy or association to commit offences)
was considered. Suggestions appeared in the early negotiations,
197
became gradually more and more important in the negotiation
process, and eventually took a central place in the latest discussions
on the Convention of 27 September 1996.198 During the negotia-
tions, it was also suggested that the Double Criminality Rule be
abandoned only if, under the requesting state's laws, the facts can
be classified as conspiracy or association to commit offences and
are punishable with a maximum penalty of at least six months.199
At least with regard to ECE and BET, double criminality and
minimum thresholds are verified by looking at the facts themselves,
without the classifications thereof in the requesting and the
requested state having to correspond.2'
The situation is very different for bilateral extradition treaties
between Belgium and other non-Schengen EU Member States
which also list extraditable offences. For example, the Spanish
government sought extradition of a Basque couple for providing
shelter and transport to members of an ETA-commando.2"'
Under Spanish law, this is classified as "association de malfaiteurs"
(association to commit offences).2' This offence is one of those
enumerated in Article 2203 of the Belgo-Spanish Extradition
Treaty of 17 June 1870.204 According to Belgian criminal law,
however, these actions cannot be regarded as .an association to
commit offences under the bilateral treaty because the couple was
not involved in the association.0' Although the Belgian Minister
of Justice agreed to extradite, the Belgian Conseil d'ltat suspended
that decision." The Convention of 27 September 1996 aban-
doned the principle of double criminality for those offences
197. See, e.g., Belgian Proposal for a Draft Convention on Improvement of
Extradition, issued in mid-1994.
198. Council No. 7753/96, 30 May 1996, 77 JUSTPEN 3-5.
199. See, e.g., Council No. 9142/95, 28 July 1995, 108 JUSTPEN 5.
200. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 21, at 195. See also Council No. 10197/95,
27 Sept. 1995, 127 JUSTPEN 2 and the remarks of the Luxembourg delegation.
201. Vermeulen & Vander Beken, supra note 188.
202. Id.
203. Prior to the enactment of the SC on 26 Mar. 1995.
204. Convention pour Assurer la Rdpression des crimes et ddlits entre la
Belgique et l'Espagne, Brussels, 17 June 1870, Moniteur Beige, 20 Aug. 1870.
205. See Article 324 of the Belgian Penal Code.
206. For a comment on the decision of the Conseil d'gtat and on the extradition
case in general, see Vermeulen & Vander Beken, supra note 188.
NEW CONVENTIONS ON EXTRADITION
classified under the law of the requesting state as conspiracy or
association to commit offences.207
Extradition cannot be refused merely because the requesting
state and requested state disagree as to whether the crime is an
indictable offence.2 8 However, there are exceptions. As reques-
ted by the Belgian delegation at the Convention of 27 September
1996,209 a reservation for extradition is possible in cases of
"conspiracy or association to commit offences. ' '211 This reserva-
tion is not absolute, since states which have entered this reservation
should attempt extradition in any case in the field of terrorism as
in Articles 1-2 of the ECST, drug trafficking, organized crime, or
any other acts of violence against the life, physical integrity or
liberty of a person, even where the accused does not take part in
the actual execution of the offence or offences concerned.211 The
person who contributes to the commission of an offence must do
so intentionally and with knowledge or with the intention to
commit the offence or the offences concerned (Article 3.4).212
1. Political offences and the non-discrimination
rule.-According to the BET (Article 3) and the ECE (Article 3.1)
extradition shall not be granted if the offence is regarded by the
requested party as a political offence or as an offence connected
with a political offence.21 3 The 1977 ECST enables the Council
of Europe Member States to not categorize a limited number of
serious, terrorism-related offences as political offences, as offences
connected with political offences, or as offences inspired by political
motives.214 Title VI of the TEU or "Third Pillar" negotiations of
207. This provided that the conspiracy or the association is to commit offences
indicated in Articles 1-2 of the ECST or any other offence punishable by
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of 12 months in the field of drug
trafficking and other forms of organized crime or other acts of violence against
life, physical integrity or liberty of a person, or creating a collective danger for
persons (Article 3). Id.
208. However this issue had been disputed during the negotiations. Initially
only Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy were in favour of a strict
prohibition. See Council No. 10290/95, 5 Oct. 1995, 130 JUSTPEN 7. However,
these coutries were later followed by Portugal and Germany (see Council No.
11267/95, 6 Nov. 1995, 148 JUSTPEN) and finally by all other Member States (see
Council No. 4364/96, 26 Jan. 1996, 11 JUSTPEN 7).
209. Council No. 7166/96, 10 May 1996, 63 JUSTPEN 6.
210. Supra note 158, at Art. 3.3.
211. Id. at Art. 3.4.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 14 and 23.
214. See supra note 25.
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the Convention of 27 September 1996 resulted in a further
215limitation of the political offence exception.
According to the most radical option, terrorist offences would
be treated as ordinary offences. 216 This option is based on the
assumption that the Member States have complete confidence in
each other's legal systems, since the political offence exception
would disappear completely in their mutual relations under this op-
217tion. However, a lack of confidence is perhaps why this option
was not acceptable to all EU Member States. 218 It appeared that
a compromise would be found in the withdrawal of the political
offence exception if the non-discrimination rule was empha-
sized.219  The non-discrimination rule (Article 2.2 of the ECE)
states that extradition shall not be granted when the requested
party has substantial: grounds for believing that a request for
extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinion.21 Proposals to embed this principle into the
relations between the EU Member States in all the conventions
discussed 221 seem rather hypocritical. After all, there is a small
chance that some Member States would express doubts with regard
to the quality of another Member State's legal system. The
Member States have repeated on different occasions222 their
mutual trust as far as judicial procedures and human rights are con-
cerned.223  However, as the non-discrimination rule remains a
purely inter-state rule, it offers no real guarantees to the requested
person. On the other hand, if the non-discrimination rule was an
additional human right, it would be very valuable because the
Strasbourg Court could then decide possible violations of the
215. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
216. Council No. 6427/95, 6 Apr. 1995, 51 JUSTPEN.
217. Id.
218. Council No. 7456/94, 14 June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN.
219. Council No. 6829/95, 2 May 1995, 66 JUSTPEN. Council No. 7968/95, 12
June 1995, 86 JUSTPEN. A similar provision can be found in the draft Treaty of
the European judicial Area, where the political offence exception was a only an
optional ground for refusal, where the violation of the non-discrimination principle
excluded extradition. See Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 45, at 1208.
220. Supra note 14, at Art. 2.2.
221. Finally, the Convention of 27 Sept. 1996, maintained the status-quo of
ECE and ECST. See Convention, 27 Sept. 1996, art. 5.3.
222. Council No. 8489/95, 26 June 1995, 97 JUSTPEN; Council No. 5288/96,26
Feb. 1996, 26 JUSTPEN.
223. The confirmation of the obligations laid down in the Refugees Convention,
Council No. 5288/96, 26 Feb. 1996, 26 JUSTPEN is to be seen in the same context.
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principle.224 However, this idea was never an issue in the discus-
sions between the EU Member States. There seemed to be strong
pressure to give priority to requirements of efficiency and coopera-
tion.2"
2. Fiscal offences.-Extradition for fiscal offences remains
controversial, even in the European Union. The traditional point
of view can be found in the BET and the ECE. Both treaties state
that extradition for offences in connection with taxes, duties, and
customs shall not be granted unless the contracting parties have so
decided.2" Since only a few states have decided to extradite,
fiscal immunity is the norm.227 Between the Schengen countries,
however, the approach to fiscal offences is more strict. Article 63
of the SC states that extradition shall be granted for a limited list
of fiscal offences such as violations with respect to excise duty,
value added tax, and custom duties. For direct tax offences,
extradition can still be denied between the Schengen countries.
2 2
Article 2 of the Second Additional Protocol to the ECE 229
abolishes the fiscal offence exception by replacing Article 5 of the
ECE. Article 2 states that extradition shall take place for any
offence in connection with taxes, duties, and exchange if the
offence under the law of the requested party corresponds to an
offence of the same nature.230
Although abolishing the fiscal offence exception had been an
objective in EU extradition discussions, it has turned out to be an
unrealistic goal. For Luxembourg, such far-reaching provisions on
224. Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 44, at 2690-92. G. Mols, Over de
(on)wenselijkheid van de depolitisering van politieke delicten, INTERNATIONALISE-
RING VAN HET STRAFRECHT 150 (1986).
225. In this respect the so-called La Gomera Declaration of 23 Nov. 1995
should be mentioned. Recalling the JHA Ministers informal meeting held in La
Gomera, Spain, on 14 Oct. 1995, the Council declared that, in order to prevent
and combat terrorist activity, there must be a thorough coordination between
Member States. This was to be accomplished by improving the mechanism of
police and judicial co-operation through handing-over to the judicial authorities
of those responsible for terrorist acts, having them stand trial and serve any
sentences imposed, and by extradition, in accordance with the provisions of
international treaties. Bulletin of the European Communities, 11 (1995), at 99; 23
490 Staten-Generaal 1995-1996, at n.90, 37.
226. See supra note 14 and 23.
227. Supra note 15.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 15 for the chart of ratifications.
230. Id.
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tax offences were unacceptable." A compromise has been found
by combining the Schengen acquis (no extradition for excise duty,
value added tax, and customs duties) and the Second Additional
Protocol provisions (no extradition exception for fiscal offences at
all). The Convention of 27 September 1996 (Article 6) states that
extradition is possible for any fiscal offence, unless a Member State
declares that extradition is limited to offences concerning excise
duty, value added tax, and custom duties.232
3. Nationals.-In Europe, except the United Kingdom, it is
a tradition not to extradite nationals. Article 6.1 of the ECE gives
the contracting parties the right to refuse extradition of their
nationals; Article 5 of the BET totally excludes extradition of
nationals. In an "integrating" modern Europe, however, the argu-
ments for an extradition refusal on that basis become vacuous.232
All EU Member States appear willing to examine the possibilities
for the extradition of nationals within the Union.' One possible
solution 5 might be the replacement of the BET and the ECE-
provisions by an Article in the Convention of 27 September 1996,
stipulating that extradition of nationals would not be refused if the
requesting state is seeking prosecution for execution. Nevertheless,
states would retain the right to refuse the extradition of nationals,
provided they submit the case to their competent authorities, so
that proper proceedings may be pursued.236 Article 68 of the SC
offers a legal basis to apply the Council of Europe's Transfer of
Sentenced Persons Convention without consent of the person on
whom the sentence or the detention order has been imposed, in
cases where this person has avoided the execution of that sentence
or order by escaping to his own country.237 This may be done
without the consent of the person on whom the sentence or
detention order has been imposed if this person escaped to his own
country.238
Finally, the Convention of 26 September 1996 between the EU
Member States provides for a total abolition of the ability to refuse
231. Council No. 6459/94,27 Apr. 1994, 28 JUSTPEN; Council No. 7456/94, 14
June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN.
232. Supra note 158.
233. Errera, supra note 28, at 330; Flore & Troosters, supra note 60, at 314.
234. Tweede Kamer (the Netherlands), 1993-1994, 23 490, n.9, at 4.
235. For other proposals, see Council No. 7456/94, 14 June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN.
236. Council No. 7871/94, 16 June 1994, 42 JUSTPEN.
237. Supra note 15.
238. Id.
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nationals. Nevertheless, Member States may declare to refuse such
extraditions or only to grant them on special grounds.2 9 These
declarations should only be temporary and should be abolished in
the long run.
It is noteworthy that there is no connection between the
discussions on extradition and those on other criminal justice
matters in the European Union. Neither the Convention on the
Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests of 26
July 1995,240 nor its Protocol,241 nor the draft Convention on the
Struggle Against Corruption242 deal with the problem of refusal
of extradition of nationals. The only shared issue concerning
nationals is the obligation to take the necessary measures to
establish jurisdiction over the offence if nationals are not extradi-
ted.
4. Lapse of time and amnesty.-In an ideal extradition
system, extradition may only be refused when the person claimed
has become immune from prosecution or punishment due to lapse
of time, under the law of the requesting state. This ideal system
has not yet been realized in the European Union. According to
Article 10 of the ECE and Article 9 of the BET, immunity due to
lapse of time in the requested, as well as in the requesting state,
can give rise to a refusal of extradition.2 43 Between the Schengen
countries, a further step has been taken in view of the interruption
of the lapse of time. It is stated in the SL that, as far as such
interruption is concerned, only the provisions of the requesting
contracting Party shall apply.2'
239. A possible condition is the guarantee that sentences will be carried out in
the requested state. See Council No. 6829/95, 2 May 1995, 66 JUSTPEN; Council
No. 7968/95, 12 June 1995, 86 JUSTPEN. Another proposal provides that a
refusal only should be possible when the requested state has jurisdiction over the
offence. See Council No. 10121/95, 27 Sept. 1995, 126 JUSTPEN.
240. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, C 316/49,27 Nov.
1995.
241. Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities Financial
Interests, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, C 313/1, 23 Oct.
1996.
242. Council No. 6185/96, 28 Mar. 1996, 42 JUSTPEN.
243. The text of both treaties is not identical. Where the ECE mentions both
requesting and requested state, the BET only deals with the requested state.
However, the result is the same because an immunity, due to lapse of time, in the
requested state makes extradition impossible since extradition could only be asked
for when prosecution or punishment in the requesting state is possible.
244. Supra note 15, at Art. 62.1.
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Under the Convention of 27 September 1996, the EU Member
States agreed that, within certain limits, the law of the requesting
state is considered when deciding whether immunity should be
implemented due to a lapse of time.245 The proposal, however,
to completely replace the ECE and the BET provisions with this
provision proved to be too ambitious.2 6 The Convention states
that the law of the requesting state is to only be considered to
decide immunity due to lapse of time if the requested state has
jurisdiction under its own criminal law to prosecute or punish the
claimed person for the offence (Article 8).247
A similar situation exists in the case of amnesty. In the
Schengen Convention, it has been agreed that when amnesty has
been granted in the requested state, extradition shall only be
refused if that state has jurisdiction under its own criminal law.2'
5. Speciality-During the early negotiations, the majority of
the delegations to every Convention were committed to not
renouncing entitlement to the Speciality Rule. Only when the
person concerned expressly renounced his entitlement to this rule
in circumstances offering him sufficient due process guarantees, the
Speciality Rule could be overruled.249
The contrast between this general commitment on the
Speciality Rule and a later proposal issued by the German delega-
tion25 was striking. The introduction of a legal fiction was
proposed: the consent of the requested state to disregard the
Speciality Rule was considered to be granted, except for general or
particular reservations made by the state concerned.21 Further,
with regard to re-extradition to a third Member State, it was even
suggested to no longer require the consent of the initially requested
state, despite Article 15 of the ECE and Article 14.1 of the
BET.25 The claimed person would then be surrendered in any
245. Supra note 158.
246. See, e.g., Council No. 7891/94, 16 June 1994, 42 JUSTPEN (German
proposal).
247. Id. This point of view is not new.
248. Supra note 15 at Art. 62.2 and Art. 9.
249. Council No. 7456/94, 14 June 1994, 41 JUSTPEN 5.
250. Council No. 7871/94, 16 June 1994, 42 JUSTPEN 10-11.
251. Id. at 16.
252. Id.
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case,253 since the requested state would not beallowed to express
reservations.
21
As. for re-extradition, it appeared to be preferable that the
tenor of the Convention on Simplified Extradition would be
repeated. 5 In light of consent from the state having granted the
initial extradition, re-extradition could be dropped whenever the
surrendered person had renounced entitlement to the Speciality
Rule256 or agreed to be re-extradited.5 7 The Convention of 27
September 1996, however, represents a small step backwards. In
principle, Article 15 of the ECE and Article 14.1 of the BET no
longer apply to relations between the EU Member States, provided
that they accept the provision that the person concerned has to
renounce entitlement to Speciality or consents to re-extradition
(Article 12), or not to accept it at all.2"'
As for the Speciality Rule, the Member States are allowed to
declare that the consent required by Articles 14.1(a) of the ECE or
13.1(a) of the BET is automatically considered to be granted. 5 9
The principle of Speciality would no longer apply to a certain
number of cases. 2 ° The consent of the requested state may be
relinquished for offences where no provisional arrest or equivalent
measure of restraint are allowed, or where the offence does not
give rise to deprivation of liberty, or any other restriction of
physical personal freedom. 261 In cases of express renunciation by
the surrendered person of his entitlement to the Speciality Rule,
253. Certain versions of the draft Convention took over this proposal. See, e.g.,
Council No. 10290/95, 5 Oct. 1995, 130 JUSTPEN 16.
254. Id.
255. This has been suggested by the French delegation. See Council No.
10290/95, 5 Oct. 1995, 130 JUSTPEN 16.
256. Council of the European Union, 6711/1/95, 31 July 1995, JUSTPEN 60, at
art. 13.
257. Id.
258. This interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention Relating to Extradition
is the only one compatible with the Convention of 10 Mar. 1995 on Simplified
Extradition Procedure.
259. Previously, it had only been suggested to allow the Member States to add
supplementary cases, for which the required consent of the requested state would
automatically be considered already mentioned in the draft Convention. See
Council No. 10290/95, 5 Oct. 1995, 130 JUSTPEN 7. It was not until afterward
that the idea to insert a provision which a general scope was raised.
260. Minimum-option Article 10.
261. See, e.g., Council No. 6427/95, 6 Apr. 1995, 51 JUSTPEN 4-5, (the Italian
proposal); Council No. 6829/95, 2 May 1995, 66 JUSTPEN 9 (the results of the
working group on extradition of 26-28 Apr. 1995); Council No. 8489/95, 26 June
1995, 97 JUSTPEN 10 (the proposal for a draft Convention, issued by the future
Spanish Presidency at the end of the French Presidency).
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the consent of the requested state may also be relinquished.262
Thus, the person concerned could not be harmed except by the
physical restraint of his personal freedom.
263
Extradition is said to be an instrument for inter-state coopera-
tion. It allows punitive imprisonment of the claimed person during
prosecution, provisional arrest, or following conviction. Conse-
quently, the Speciality Rule aims to protect the surrendered person
against prosecution or punishment for offences committed prior to
his surrender (other than those for which he was extradited).
However, the surrendered person is only protected from physical
restraint.
264
Many dispute that the Speciality Rule only applies to offences
that restrict a person's physical personal freedom or to minor
offences. 265 As non-privative penalties, such as monetary sanc-
tions or deprivation of certain rights, become increasingly important
in today's criminal law systems, the settlement in the Convention
of 27 September 1996 may erode the principle of Speciality.266 It
is a fiction to pretend that only physical deprivation of liberty could
restrain a person's individual freedom.
Moreover, the starting point is not pursued consistently: if
necessary, non-privative penalties, including monetary sanctions,
can be substituted by imprisonment (Article 10.1.c).
267
Every attempt to modify the Speciality Rule implies that for
certain offences committed by the claimed person prior to his
surrender and for which, following his surrender, he could be
prosecuted or punished, the normal judicial and political control of
the requested state is relinquished. In democratic constitutional
systems, however, it is essential to preserve the right to examine
whether certain extradition conditions are met or whether certain
basic rules (ne bis in idem, 64 non-discrimination) are observed. 69
262. This was suggested during negotiations by the Dutch, see Council No.
6426/95, 6 Apr. 1995, 50 JUSTPEN 3, and the Italian delegations, see Council No.
6427/95, 6 Apr. 1995, 51 JUSTPEN 4-5.
263. Id.
264. Council No. 6427/95, 6 Apr. 1995, 51 JUSTPEN 4.
265. ZAVRI, supra note 152, at 34-35.
266. See also Council No. 10197/95, 27 Sept. 1995, 127 JUSTPEN 3 (remarks
made by the Luxembourg delegation).
267. Initially, a proposal had been issued by the German and Dutch delega-
tions. Council No. 9142/95, 28 July 1995, 108 JUSTPEN 6). Further, it was
announced that the Explanatory Report to the Convention Relating to Extradition
would clarify which situations are envisioned here. See Council No. 11795/95, 17
Nov. 1995, 159 JUSTPEN 25.
268. ZAVRI, supra note 152, 100-01.
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Supplemental extradition may be requested for offences
already known to the competent prosecuting authorities of the
requesting state at the time extradition is requested. As indicated,
the Convention of 27 September 1996 extends the system of
supplemental extradition to monetary sanctions (Article 2.3).270
Therefore, the current erosion of the Speciality Rule seems even
less justified.
6. Inter-state conflicts: Convention on Improvement of
Extradition.-In the middle of 1995, the Spanish Presidency asked
the Council to take note of differences that might arise between
Member States regarding the application of the Convention on the
Improvement of Extradition.271 It was also proposed that the
Member States stipulate that the Court of Justice of the European
Communities is deemed competent to deal with prejudicial
questions of interpretation or to decide the differences if the
Council could not settle the dispute within six months.
272
The impetus to deal with this issue in the Convention itself was
abandoned because of the repeated objections from the United
Kingdom during the Europol-Convention negotiations. 273 This
issue will most likely appear in future negotiations.274
269. Luxembourg finds it unacceptable that the Speciality Rule would be
generally abolished for offences that do lead to a deprivation of liberty or any
other restriction of personal freedom. The implication of this could be that
extradition is granted for a value added tax offence and that after surrender of the
person concerned, the person is prosecuted or punished for a fiscal offence not
connected with an excise duty, a value added tax or custom duties and is also
subjected to a monetary penalty. See, e.g., Council No. 4364/96, 26 Jan. 1996, 11
JUSTPEN 14. In later versions of the draft, Luxembourg concerns have been
taken into account. See, e.g., Council No. 8724/1/96, 17 July 1996, REV 1 99
JUSTPEN. Finally, Article 10.4 of the Convention of 27 Sept. 1996 Relating to
Extradition provides for an "opt-out" possibility with relation to fiscal offences not
connected with excise duty, value added tax, or custom duties.
270. Supra note 158.
271. Council No. 8489/95, 26 June 1995, 97 JUSTPEN 15.
272. Id.
273. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, C 316/01,27 Nov.
1995. In contrast with earlier draft versions, and as a result of the repeated veto
of the United Kingdom against a possible role of the Court of Justice with regard
to dispute settling, the present Article 40 of the Convention does not contain any
provision about this. Id.
274. Council No. 7166/96, 10 May 1996, 63 JUSTPEN 1-2. According to the
Council declaration on the follow up to the Convention, attached to the
Convention of 27 Sept. 1996, the Council will consider, one year after the
enactment of the Convention, whether jurisdiction should be given to the Court
of Justice of the European Communities.
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In addition, there also was a Belgian proposal to insert an
Article in the Convention Relating to Extradition. This Article
would provide for no unilateral suspension of the cooperation
between Member States. 75 This would have a positive impact on
the application of Articles 60, 65 and the Vienna Treaty On the
Law of Treaties of 13 May 1969. Since this proposal was criticized
by the other delegations, 27 6 Belgium proposed, as a compromise,
to adopt a common declaration to the new Convention on that
subject. 77 Ultimately, the Convention of 27 September 1996
contains no provision on the matter. However, the question will be
revisited in discussions on the competence of the Court of Justice
with regard to prejudicial questions of interpretation or inter-state
conflicts.
V. Conclusion
While many issues were discussed during the course of the
extradition negotiations following the enactment of the TEU, fairly
satisfactory agreements were reached on simplified extradition
procedure, the extraditional threshold, extradition for tax offences,
extradition of nationals, lapse of time, and amnesty.
On fundamental points, however, the outcome of the negotia-
tions seems rather negative. The Convention on Simplified
Extradition Procedure does not supplement the BET or the SC.
The Speciality Rule, both in the simplified extradition procedure
and in general, is being eroded, the Double Criminality Rule is
abolished in cases of conspiracy or association to commit offences.
The non-discrimination rule remains a purely inter-state rule and
therefore is of very little value to the subject concerned. Lastly, an
agreement on clear rules regarding dispute settlement could not be
reached.
In the field of extradition between the EU Member States,
legal protection is increasingly dominated by law enforcement
requirements and political considerations.
275. It appears that this Belgian demand was a result of the lasting conflict with
Spain about the extradition of the Basque couple. After the suspension of the
extradition decision by the Belgian Conseil d'Etat, Spain expressed its intention to
suspend unilaterally suspend the application of Chapters II and IV of Title III of
the SC in its bilateral relation with Belgium. This is in conflict with all interna-
tional obligations.
276. Council No. 7166/96, 10 May 1996, 63 JUSTPEN 2; Council No. 7753/96,
30 May 1996, 77 JUSTPEN 8.
277. Id.
